Can you be forced to unlock your phone?

Under s. 3LA of the Crimes Act 1914 (Cth), a magistrate may order a person to provide information or assistance to allow access to data; non-compliance carries up to 5 years (300 penalty units), or 10 years (600 units) in serious-offence cases — raised from 2 years by the Assistance and Access Act 2018. NSW and Queensland maintain parallel schemes.

Biometrics appear to get no better treatment: the s. 3LA duty is reportedly read broadly, and NSW digital evidence access orders (LEPRA s. 76AO) expressly extend to fingerprint and Face ID, with self-incrimination excluded as a "reasonable excuse".

Australian Border Force may examine and copy device data without a warrant under s. 186 of the Customs Act 1901; sources report no legal duty to disclose a passcode at the border, but refusal reportedly often results in the device being detained for forensic examination.

No provision compelling a suspect to reveal an access code was found, and refusal does not appear punishable (nemo tenetur); practitioner guidance is uniform that a suspect need not disclose the PIN, and authorities reportedly depend on forensic access instead.

No Austrian statute or leading decision on forcibly using a suspect’s fingerprint or face to unlock a device was found; the question is unresolved.

No special border powers over device access were identified beyond ordinary customs control of goods; since the 2025 reform, analyzing a seized data carrier reportedly requires judicial authorization.

Under art. 88quater § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure an investigating judge may order anyone shown to know a device’s access code to disclose it — the Court of Cassation confirmed on 4 Feb 2020 (P.19.1086.N) that this includes the suspect — with refusal punishable by six months to three years and/or a fine (§ 3). The suspect cannot be ordered to actively operate the device (§ 2); the Constitutional Court (no. 28/2020) upheld the duty.

No leading judgment addresses physically forced fingerprint or face unlock; commentary suggests it would likely be permissible because biometric features do not depend on the suspect’s will, but the point is not settled.

Customs supervise goods at borders under ordinary customs law; the code-disclosure duty requires an investigating judge’s order, and no special border password regime was identified.

No mechanism compelling password disclosure was found, and refusal does not appear punishable (Art. 5, LXIII Constitution; nemo tenetur). STJ case law (RHC 51.531 of 2016; RHC 89.981; a 2021 Sixth Panel ruling) treats phone data obtained without judicial authorization, or through pressured "consent" to unlock, as unlawful evidence.

No STF or STJ decision squarely addresses physically forced fingerprint or face unlock. Under STF Tema 977 (2025), access to data on a seized phone requires free express consent or a prior judicial decision; whether a judge could order biometric cooperation is untested.

Receita Federal customs inspection targets dutiable goods and baggage limits; no special border power over device data was identified.

No statute compelling password disclosure was found; in R. v. Shergill (Ont. C.J. 2019) the court refused to use a Criminal Code s. 487.02 assistance order to make an accused unlock his phone, holding compulsion would breach the Charter right to silence. No appellate ruling on the question was found.

A March 2026 Ontario Court of Justice ruling refused a warrant compelling a suspect to apply a fingerprint or face to unlock seized devices, treating biometrics like passcodes — but the authority is trial-level only, so the question remains unsettled.

CBSA reportedly examines devices under Customs Act s. 99 and may ask for passwords; Alain Philippon was fined C$500 in 2016 (s. 153.1, hindering) for refusing. R. v. Canfield (Alta. C.A. 2020) and R. v. Pike (Ont. C.A. 2024) held suspicionless device examinations unconstitutional; replacement legislation (Bill S-7) died at the January 2025 prorogation.

§ 78 of the Criminal Procedure Code obliges surrender of the thing (the device), not disclosure of its password; refusal to reveal a code does not appear punishable, and Constitutional Court case law is described as barring compulsion of self-incriminating cooperation by disciplinary fines.

Practitioner commentary argues forced placement of a suspect’s finger on the sensor is permissible "passive endurance" rather than prohibited active cooperation; no published Czech high-court ruling decides the point.

Customs conducts ordinary supervision of travellers and baggage; no special power to demand device passwords or search contents at the border was identified.

Under retsplejeloven § 750 police may question people but cannot require anyone to make a statement and may not use force to make anyone speak; commentary accordingly states police cannot compel disclosure of a PIN, and no penalty for refusal was found.

By kendelse of 14 February 2019 (cases 92/2018 and 123/2018) the Supreme Court held that briefly forcing a suspect’s thumb onto a phone’s fingerprint reader falls under the search rules, subject to proportionality, and could proceed without a prior court order given the risk of data loss.

Under toldloven, persons entering or leaving reportedly must stop for customs control of transport and luggage; no special statutory power to demand device passwords at the border was identified.

Under the Coercive Measures Act (806/2011) ch. 8 s. 23, the holder, administrator or user of an information system must give investigators the passwords needed for a device search — but the duty expressly does not apply to the suspect or persons entitled to refuse to testify.

In decision EOAK/6374/2017 (23 March 2018) the Deputy Parliamentary Ombudsman found that a suspect’s fingerprints may be taken for any suspected offence and used to open the suspect’s phone — with the mildest workable means — while a password or PIN may not be compelled.

Customs inspects travellers’ luggage and outer clothing under the Customs Act (304/2016), with stricter conditions for more thorough inspections; no special border power to demand device passwords was identified.

Article 434-15-2 of the Penal Code punishes refusal to hand over a decryption key to judicial authorities: up to 3 years and a €270,000 fine (5 years / €450,000 where disclosure would have prevented a crime). The Cour de cassation (Ass. plén., 7 Nov 2022, no. 21-83.146) held a phone’s unlock code can be such a key when the phone is encrypted; the Constitutional Council upheld the offence (2018-696 QPC).

The offence targets disclosure of a code; no statute or leading case authorizes physically forcing a finger or face onto a device, so the question is unsettled.

Customs may search goods, vehicles and persons — phones included — in border areas without individual suspicion (Customs Code arts. 60 ff., rewritten by the law of 18 July 2023 after a constitutional censure); the refusal offence is reported to apply to judicial demands, not routine customs checks.

No mechanism to compel a suspect to disclose a PIN or password was found: § 136 StPO guarantees the right not to respond, and the Federal Court of Justice’s 2025 unlocking decision itself proceeds on the basis that codes cannot be forced.

BGH, decision of 13 March 2025 (2 StR 232/24): forcibly placing a suspect’s finger on a seized phone’s sensor is covered by § 81b(1) StPO where a judicial search order targets the phone and the access is proportionate. Commentators dispute the constitutional soundness of that basis.

Customs may control persons and luggage in a border zone without suspicion, but as a goods control; reading out device data requires ordinary judicial orders, and no border power to demand passwords was identified.

Article 20(3) of the Constitution bars compelling an accused to be a witness against themselves. Virendra Khanna v State of Karnataka (Karnataka HC, 2021) treated passwords as non-testimonial and allowed directions; CBI v Mahesh Kumar Sharma (Delhi special court, 2022) and Sanket Bhadresh Modi v CBI (Delhi HC, reported Jan 2024) held an accused cannot be coerced to disclose passwords.

The Criminal Procedure (Identification) Act 2022 on its text obliges arrested persons to give "measurements" including finger impressions and iris scans, with refusal an offence on that text — but whether such biometrics can be used to force-unlock a device has not been decided by the Supreme Court.

Customs officers reportedly have broad statutory powers to search persons and examine and seize goods, which is said in practice to extend to devices, but no provision or ruling specifically empowers border officers to demand passwords or unlock devices; the position is untested.

Under s. 48 of the Criminal Justice (Theft and Fraud Offences) Act 2001 (as substituted), Gardaí executing a warrant may require a person to furnish any password needed; on the statute’s text refusal is an offence under s. 49. A District Court order under s. 15 of the Criminal Justice Act 2011 (white-collar offences) can, on its text, likewise require passwords.

In Poptoshev v DPP [2025] IESC 47 the Supreme Court treated compelled biometric operations alongside passwords under the warrant regime: neither the compelled act nor the revealed password can prove control of the device, but its contents remain admissible.

Customs officers may examine travellers’ baggage including devices, and a court upheld an immigration officer’s examination of an arriving non-national’s phone under s. 7 of the Immigration Act 2004; no border password-refusal offence was identified.

No mechanism compelling disclosure was found, and refusal is reportedly not an offence (nemo tenetur; Cass. n. 17604/2023 as reported in legal analyses). Cass. sez. II n. 7568/2021 permitted treating refusal as relevant to evidence-tampering risk in custody decisions.

No Italian statute or published ruling squarely authorizes forcibly using a suspect’s fingerprint or face to unlock a device; the domestic question remains open.

Customs powers concern travellers’ goods and baggage; no special regime compelling access to device contents at the border was identified.

Per a Law Library of Congress review, the Code of Criminal Procedure lets officers executing a search ask the person to operate the computer or cooperate (including decryption), and courts can order decryption — but a person who refuses is not penalized. Article 38 of the Constitution bars compelled self-incrimination.

Osaka police have reportedly obtained court warrants that, on refusal, allow officers to hold the phone near the suspect’s face briefly to trigger facial recognition. Commentators question the permissible degree of force, and no high-court ruling settles the practice — treated here as unsettled.

Customs conducts declaration checks and baggage inspection under the Customs Act; no special legal power to demand passwords or examine device contents at the border is documented.

Article 20 of the Constitution guarantees the right to silence from the moment of detention, and our research found no statute authorizing compelled password disclosure — but the specific question is untested in court, so the honest answer is unsettled. The SCJN case law cited below concerns judicial authorization to access phone data, which is not the same question.

No statute or high-court ruling addresses forced fingerprint or face unlock; commentators describe the issue as debated and untested.

Customs screening (ANAM) concerns dutiable goods and baggage; no special border regime for device contents was identified in our sources, and the judicial-order requirement for phone data applies to all authorities.

The decryption order of art. 125k(3) of the Code of Criminal Procedure may not be addressed to the suspect — an expression of the privilege against self-incrimination — and refusal by a suspect does not appear punishable.

Hoge Raad, 9 Feb 2021 (ECLI:NL:HR:2021:202): police lawfully forced a handcuffed suspect’s thumb onto his iPhone’s scanner; biometric unlocking under slight physical coercion does not breach nemo tenetur, provided proportionality and subsidiarity are respected.

Customs exercise general goods-control powers; no special power for border officers to demand passwords or examine phone content without suspicion was identified.

S. 130 of the Search and Surveillance Act 2012 obliges a specified person to provide access information and assistance; failing without reasonable excuse is an offence under s. 178 (up to 3 months). The s. 130(2) self-incrimination limit protects the information itself, but s. 130(3) on its text still requires unlocking a device that merely contains incriminating material.

No separate biometric rule: the s. 130 duty covers access information and assistance generally, and the border regime is described officially as covering passwords, PINs and fingerprints.

Under s. 228 of the Customs and Excise Act 2018, a traveller reportedly must provide access when a customs officer has reasonable cause to suspect relevant offending; refusal is an offence with a fine up to NZ$5,000, and the device can be retained for a full search.

Straffeprosessloven § 199a lets police, during a search of a data system, order anyone with dealings with the system to give the information needed to access it; the order cannot be used against the suspect or persons exempt from testifying (privilege against self-incrimination, § 90).

In HR-2016-1833-A the Supreme Court held the then-law gave no authority to force a suspect’s finger onto a phone; the Act of 21 June 2017 no. 92 amended § 199a so police may reportedly carry out biometric authentication by force on a decision of the prosecuting authority.

Customs may control goods and inspect persons at the border under the goods-movement act (2022); no special statutory power to demand device codes was identified.

Art. 74 § 1 of the Code of Criminal Procedure: the accused has no obligation to provide evidence to his own detriment; no offence punishing refusal to give a password was found. Devices can reportedly be demanded from their holders under arts. 217/236a k.p.k., but that is not described as extending to compelling a suspect’s password.

Commentary treats biometric unlocking like passcodes — suggesting police may only request a voluntary unlock; no provision or published ruling authorizes physically forcing a suspect’s finger or face onto a device.

The Border Guard may search a person, luggage and vehicle on reasonable suspicion under its general powers; no special device-password regime at the border was identified.

Article 14 of Law 109/2009 (Cybercrime Law) allows injunctions to produce data or grant access, but under art. 14(5) the injunction cannot be directed at the suspect or arguido; systems used for law, medicine, banking and journalism are also shielded.

No statute or published high-court decision squarely addresses forcibly using a suspect’s fingerprint or face to unlock a device; the question is untested.

Border checks focus on identity and entry conditions; no special power to demand device passwords at the border was identified.

Criminal Procedure Code 2010 ss. 39–40 empower police (s. 40 with Public Prosecutor authorization) to require any person reasonably suspected of using or knowing a computer to grant access or decryption information for investigating an arrestable offence; non-compliance is an offence with tiered fines and imprisonment (reported up to S$50,000 / 10 years at the top tier).

Practitioner analysis describes the compelled-access powers as broad but calls the position on physically forced biometric unlock unresolved; in practice police request the PIN or password.

No separate border password law was identified, but the ordinary CPC compelled-access powers are reported to apply at checkpoints, where ICA officers additionally hold statutory search and seizure powers.

No mechanism compelling password disclosure was found, and refusal does not appear to be an offence; Article 12(2) of the Constitution provides that no citizen shall be compelled to testify against himself in criminal cases.

No statute or reported court decision addresses physically forcing a suspect to use a fingerprint or face to unlock a device; the question is untested in accessible sources.

Arriving travellers face ordinary customs declaration and baggage inspection; no special legal regime for searching device contents or demanding passwords at the border is documented.

The duty to assist investigators in accessing a computer system (LECrim art. 588 septies b) expressly does not apply to the "investigado o encausado", and no offence punishing a suspect’s refusal to give a code was found. Third parties who know a system can reportedly be ordered to assist.

There is no consolidated Supreme Court doctrine on physically forcing a detainee to unlock a device with a fingerprint or face; commentators are divided and the point is untested.

No special border regime over device contents was identified; since the 2015 LECrim reform, examining a seized phone’s contents reportedly requires specific judicial authorization stating scope and reasons.

No mechanism to compel disclosure of a PIN or password was found; the right against self-incrimination is described as applying, and the Parliamentary Ombudsman has criticized police for even asking a suspect for a PIN outside a formal interrogation.

Under rättegångsbalken 27 kap. 17 f § (prop. 2021/22:119, in force 1 June 2022), a person presumed able to open a device biometrically must, on the provision’s text, assist on police order; if they refuse, the provision reportedly allows an officer to perform the authentication, using force if met with resistance.

Customs may examine luggage and seize devices at entry/exit under the consolidated customs-powers law (2024:710); devices found are reportedly to be formally seized before contents are examined, and no border power to demand passwords was found.

Art. 113 of the Criminal Procedure Code: the accused need not incriminate themselves and may refuse to cooperate; no provision penalizing refusal to reveal a code was found. In BGE 151 IV 73 (2025) the Federal Supreme Court treated a police request for a suspect’s PIN during a search as an interrogation requiring a prior caution — a code obtained without it was inadmissible.

No statutory rule and no published Federal Supreme Court decision squarely authorizes forcibly using a suspect’s fingerprint or face; Swiss commentary describes the question as disputed.

Customs and border security may inspect a phone as an object (e.g. for smuggling checks), but per the customs administration its contents are not examined as a matter of course, and passwords are generally not demanded.

The Computer-Related Crime Act B.E. 2550 (2007, amended 2017) s. 18(7) authorizes officials — with a court order under s. 19 — to decrypt, order persons to decrypt, or order cooperation in decryption; s. 27 punishes non-compliance with a fine up to THB 200,000 plus up to THB 5,000 per day.

No provision or reported case distinguishes biometric unlocking from passwords; the point is untested.

Reporting on entry practice states immigration officers cannot lawfully force a traveller to unlock a phone and that accessing stored data requires court-approved orders, though officers retain discretion to deny a foreigner entry.

No offence punishing refusal to disclose a code was found; Anayasa art. 38 bars compelled self-incrimination, and CMK art. 134(2) allows temporary seizure of the device for decryption and copying when the password cannot be solved.

No statute or published decision addressing forced fingerprint or face unlocking was found; the question is untested.

No special statutory power to demand device passwords at the border was identified — customs phone checks concern import duty and IMEI registration — but press-freedom reporting documents airport detentions, device searches and deportations of journalists and critics.

The Criminal Procedure Law (Federal Decree-Law 38/2022) and the Cybercrimes Law (Federal Decree-Law 34/2021) grant broad investigative powers, but no accessible provision or published decision addresses compelled passcode disclosure or a penalty for refusal — the position cannot be stated either way.

No accessible law or reported case addresses compelled biometric unlocking of devices.

Customs and security screen travellers and baggage at UAE airports, and content stored on a device can itself ground prosecution under content and cybercrime laws, but no transparent legal framework on demanding device access at the border could be verified.

On its text, a notice under s. 49 of the Regulation of Investigatory Powers Act 2000 compels disclosure of a key or password; failing to comply is an offence under s. 53 (up to 2 years, rising to 5 in national-security and child-indecency cases). R v S(F) [2008] EWCA Crim 2177 held the scheme compatible with the privilege against self-incrimination.

No statute clearly authorizes forcing a finger or face onto a device; the s. 49 regime covers disclosure of keys and passwords, and commentary describes forced biometric unlocking as untested.

Under Schedule 7 to the Terrorism Act 2000, examining officers at ports may stop and question travellers without suspicion; the duty to give information has been held to include device passwords, and wilful refusal has been prosecuted as an offence — upheld in Rabbani v DPP [2018] EWHC 1156 (Admin).

Courts have applied the Fifth Amendment "testimonial act" and "foregone conclusion" framework and reached opposite results: State v. Andrews (N.J. 2020) and People v. Sneed (Ill. 2023) allowed compelled passcodes; Commonwealth v. Davis (Pa. 2019) and State v. Valdez (Utah 2023) held compulsion unconstitutional. The Supreme Court denied review of Valdez in June 2024, leaving the split in place.

United States v. Payne (9th Cir. 2024) upheld a compelled thumbprint unlock as non-testimonial on its particular facts, while United States v. Brown (D.C. Cir. 2025) held compelled unlocking testimonial on different facts — a live federal circuit split in which the specific circumstances (warrant, whose finger, what officers already knew) may well decide the outcome.

CBP asserts authority to conduct "basic" manual device searches without individualized suspicion and "advanced" forensic searches on reasonable suspicion; circuits disagree on the limits. U.S. citizens reportedly cannot be refused entry for declining to unlock, though devices might be seized and detained.