Where leaked passwords come from
A website stores enough information to recognise your password when you sign in. Good sites store a slow salted hash, not the password itself. Breaches still expose password databases, and bad implementations, old algorithms or weak passwords let attackers recover many of the original values. Those values are collected into cracking lists and tried elsewhere.
A match therefore says something about the password, not the health of the device in your hand. It does not prove malware read your keyboard or that the account you are checking was the breached site. It may have come from a different service years ago.
How checking works without revealing the password
Sealby’s checker computes a SHA-1 fingerprint of the complete password inside your browser. SHA-1 is used here only as the lookup format required by the Pwned Passwords database, not to store or protect your password. The page sends the first five hexadecimal characters of that fingerprint — never the password and never the full fingerprint.
The service returns hundreds of fingerprint endings that share that prefix, padded to make response sizes less revealing. Your browser compares the real ending locally and ignores padding entries. This is called k-anonymity: the server sees a crowd of possible passwords, while your device knows which complete fingerprint to look for.
What a match honestly means
A match means the exact password fingerprint is present in known compromised-password data. Attackers can put that password near the front of a guessing list. It does not tell you who used it, which breach exposed it, or whether a particular account has already been opened.
The danger concentrates where you reused it. Automated credential-stuffing tools try a leaked email-and-password pair across mail, shops, social networks and financial services. One old breach becomes several account takeovers because the password travelled.
Fix it in this order
1. Remove the reuse. Change the password everywhere it appears. Start with email and any account that can reset other accounts, then financial services, work, social accounts and shops. Sign out unknown sessions while you are there.
2. Make every replacement unique. A password manager can generate and remember random passwords. For secrets you must type or remember, use several randomly chosen words from the passphrase generator. Do not make one strong password and reuse it.
3. Add a second barrier. Turn on 2FA, preferably an authenticator or hardware key rather than SMS where the service offers a choice. A passkey is even better where supported because it is unique to the site and resists phishing.
What a clean result cannot prove
No breach corpus contains every stolen password. A site may not know it was breached, an attacker may keep data private, and a weak password can be guessed without ever appearing in a leak. “Not found” is one useful signal, not a strength certificate.
Judge the full setup: unique per site, long or randomly generated, stored safely, and backed by 2FA or passkeys. If you want to see why length and storage algorithms change guessing time, read how brute-force attacks work.